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R. CLARK, Esq.

CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Office: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimant/Appellants
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

PROFITS PLUS CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; and DOLLARS AND
SENSE GROWTH FUND, LP, a Delaware
limited partnership; and ROBERT COLEMAN, an
individual,
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Respondents,

Supreme Court Docket No. 39964-2012
Ada County Case No. CV OC 1014540

APPELLANTS' MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REHEARING

vs.
JEFFREY POD EST A, an individual; and
STREET SEARCH, LLC, a New Jersey
limited liability company,
Defendants-Counterc laimants-Appellants.

COME NOW the Appellants, and hereby file their Memorandum in Support of Petition
for Rehearing.

ARGUMENT
I. The Court Misapplied the Standard of Review.

Respectfully, the Appellants believe the Court misapplied the standard of review to the
facts of this case. The Respondents sought a declaratory judgment asserting there was no
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contractual relationship whatsoever with the Appellants. If these allegations were true then
Podesta and Street Search were in Idaho for less than 24 hours for essentially a vacation.
"The question of the existence of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant is one oflaw, which this Court reviews freely. Blimka v. My Web
Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 726, 152 P.3d 594, 597 (2007) (quoting Knutsen
v. Cloud, 142 Idaho 148, 150, 124 P.3d 1024, 1026 (2005)). When reviewing a
motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction, this Court applies the
same standard as when reviewing appeals from summary judgment orders; "we
construe the evidence presented to the district court in favor of the party opposing
the order and accord that party the benefit of all inferences which might be
reasonably drawn." Knutsen, 142 Idaho at 150, 124 P.3d at 1026. Accordingly, in
reviewing the district court's denial of Street Search's motion to dismiss, we
construe the evidence in favor of Coleman." 1
Neither Blimpka nor Cloud, however, addresses a declaratory judgment action. In this case the
Respondents allege there was no contract, and accordingly, nothing Podesta and/or Street Search
did in any jurisdiction gave rise to a contractual relationship with any Respondent The operative
language in the Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint requesting declaratory judgment is:
19. Street Search and/or Jeff Podesta have asserted that one or both of them has
some ownership interest in Dollars and Sense or Profits Plus.
20. Plaintiffs deny that Street Search and/or Jeff Podesta have any ownership
interest in Dollars and Sense or Profits Plus whatsoever.
21. Demand has been made by Street Search and/or Jeff Podesta for payment in
excess of $1,000,000.00 relating to this alleged ownership interest
22. Plaintiffs request the court to enter a Declaratory Judgment decreeing that
neither Street Search nor Jeff Podesta have any right. title or interest in and to
Dollars and Sense and or Profits Plus or anv of their assets and that the
independent contractor consulting agreement entered into with Street Search and
or Jeff Podesta has been terminated. (R p. 28.)
Applying this standard, then nothing Podesta or Street Search did while in Idaho for less
than 24 hours, constituted "doing business" in Idaho. In other words Coleman wants to claim a
contractual relationship for jurisdictional purposes, yet, in the same breath deny any contract was

1

Opinion, p. 5.
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ever formed or existed. 2 This leads to the ultimate conclusion if the Respondents are right and
no contract existed, neither did personal jurisdiction. As it would appear to violate a defendant's
right to due process if a plaintiff is allowed to resent conflicting evidence for the sole purpose of
establishing jurisdiction, the Court erred when it disregarded plaintiffs' conflicting allegations.

II. The Court Erred When It Considered The Three Plaintiffs As Essentially One Entity
For Jurisdictional Purposes.
Respectfully, the Appellants contend the Court erred when it considered all plaintiffs as a
single entity for jurisdictional purposes. While there clearly are three separate and distinct
plaintiffs in this case, the Court appears to treat an individual and two foreign entities as one for
the jurisdictional purposes. Thus, the question arises as to whether the Court should consider the
alleged residence of a party who has no standing to assert a claim?
The Dollars and Sense Fund was a Delaware Limited Partnership, as plaintiffs pled.
However, plaintiffs raised no allegation that Idaho was the Fund's principal place of business, or
that the Fund was even doing business in Idaho. "Plaintiff Dollars and Sense Growth Fund LP is
at all times relevant hereto was a Delaware limited partnership ("Dollars and Sense")." (Verified
Complaint, para. 1; R. p. 26.)
The Respondents then pled that plaintiff Profits Plus Capital Management was a
Delaware Limited Liability Company. While the Respondents pled that Profits Plus was "doing
business in .. .Idaho," the plaintiffs failed to allege that Profits Plus maintained its principle place
ofbusiness in Idaho. "Plaintiff Profits Plus Capital Management L.L.C. is and at all times

2

Mr. Podesta obviously believes he was "hometowned" in this case. Fortunately, due to the jurisdictional nature of
this action, the Untitled States Supreme Court has ultimate authority to review this case. It presents an interesting
due process argument, which may pique the United States Supreme Court's interest for review, when it appears a
lower court considered what is clearly conflicting evidence in order to assert personal jurisdiction. There is also the
question of jurisdiction involving unregistered foreign entities and the fact that Coleman lured Podesta and Street
Search to Idaho and but for Coleman's contact, there is no evidence that Podesta or Street Search would have ever
been in the state of Idaho.
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relevant was a Delaware limited liability company doing business in Ada County and Canyon
County Idaho ("Profits Plus"). (Verified Complaint, para. 2.)
The Respondents also identified Robert Coleman as a plaintiff, but stated at all times he
was acting in an individual capacity. "Plaintiff Robert Coleman is and at all times relevant
hereto was an individual doing business in Ada County and Canyon County, Idaho." (Verified
Complaint, para. 3.) (Emphasis added.)
While the Respondents name these three parties, it only addresses two of the parties; the
foreign LP and foreign LLC in its declaratory judgment claim.
22. Plaintiffs request the court to enter a Declaratory Judgment decreeing that
neither Street Search nor Jeff Podesta have any right title or interest in and to
Dollars and Sense and or Profits Plus or any of their assets and that the
independent contractor consulting agreement entered into with Street Search and
or Jeff Podesta has been terminated. (R. p. 28.) (Emphasis added.)
According to Idaho Code, 3A the governing law is of the state of record for the foreign
entity. Therefore, Delaware law controls for determining the rights and responsibilities of the
relevant foreign LP and the foreign LLC.
Like an Idaho LLC, a Delaware LLC is a separate and distinct entity from its members or
managers.
Delaware Code, Title 6 § 18-701 Nature of limited liability company interest.
A limited liability company interest is personal property. A member has no interest in
specific limited liability company property. (Emphasis added.)

3

I. C. §_30-6-80 1. Governing law. ( 1) The law of the state or other jurisdiction under which a foreign limited liability
company is formed governs:
(a) The internal affairs of the company; and
(b) The liability of a member as member and a manager as manager for the debts, obligations or other liabilities of
the company;
4
I. C. § 53-2-901. Governing law. ( 1) The laws of the state or other jurisdiction under which a foreign limited
partnership is organized govern relations among the partners of the foreign limited partnership and between the
partners and the foreign limited partnership and the liability of partners as partners for an obligation of the foreign
limited partnership.
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Delaware Code. Title 6 § 18-303 Liability to third parties.
(a) Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, the debts, obligations and
liabilities of a limited liability company, whether arising in contract, tort or
otherwise, shall be solely the debts, obligations and liabilities of the limited
liability company, and no member or manager of a limited liability company shall
be obligated personally for any such debt, obligation or liability of the limited
liability company solely by reason of being a member or acting as a manager of
the limited liability company.

The same status is true for a foreign LP; a limited partnership is a distinct legal entity.
Delaware Code, Title 6 § 15-201 Partnership as entity.
(a) A partnership is a separate legal entity which is an entity distinct from its
partners unless otherwise provided in a statement of partnership existence or a
statement of qualification and in a partnership agreement. (Emphasis added.)
Delaware Code, Title 6 § 15-203 Partnership property.
Unless otherwise provided in a statement of partnership existence or a statement
of qualification and in a partnership agreement, property acquired by a partnership
is property ofthe partnership and not of the partners individually. (Emphasis
added.)
Delaware Code, Title 6 § 17-403 General powers and liabilities.
(a) Except as provided in this chapter or in the partnership agreement, a general
partner of a limited partnership has the rights and powers and is subject to the
restrictions of a partner in a partnership that is governed by the Delaware Uniform
Partnership Law in effect on July 11, 1999 (6 Del. C. § 1501 et seq.).
(b) Except as provided in this chapter, a general partner of a limited partnership
has the liabilities of a partner in a partnership that is governed by the Delaware
Uniform Partnership Law in effect on July 11, 1999 (6 Del. C. § 1501 et seq.) to
persons other than the partnership and the other partners. Except as provided in
this chapter or in the partnership agreement, a general partner of a limited
partnership has the liabilities of a partner in a partnership that is governed by the
Delaware Uniform Partnership Law in effect on July 11, 1999 (6 Del. C. § 1501 et
seq.) to the partnership and to the other partners.
While the Court repeatedly refers to Coleman as an "owner" of the foreign LLC and
foreign LP, that designation is legally unfounded. By statute, members of a Delaware LLC are
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not "owners" of their company. Nor are general partners owners of a Delaware Limited
Partnership.
Respondents' declaratory judgment allegations clearly address claims against a foreign
LP and a foreign LLC. Coleman is not even mentioned in the substantive allegations in the
Verified Complaint. 5 Nothing alleged in the Verified Complaint establishes Coleman has any
personal interest in any allegation raised for decision for declaratory judgment. Moreover, even
Coleman states in his allegations under the "jurisdiction" section ofhis Verified Complaint that
he was always acting as an "individual."
As a foreign LP and a foreign LLC are separate and distinct legal entities separate and
apart from their individual members, for jurisdictional purposes why would these entities be
entitled to claim the jurisdiction of a member of the foreign LLC to establish a jurisdictional
basis for both the foreign LP and LLC? Considering the allegations are strictly for declaratory
judgment, Coleman lacks any standing to participate in his individual capacity in any claims
directed at the foreign LLC and foreign LP. If Coleman lacks any standing to intercede as an
individual in this case, why is his residence or domicile of any consequence for jurisdiction?
However, this clearly this is what the Court concluded with statements such as: "Here,
Street Search entered into a business relationship with Coleman, a resident of Idaho, that lasted

5

The operative language in the Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint requesting declaratory judgment is:
19. Street Search and/or Jeff Podesta have asserted that one or both of them has some ownership
interest in Dollars and Sense or Profits Plus.
20. Plaintiffs deny that Street Search and/or Jeff Podesta have any ownership interest in Dollars
and Sense or Profits Plus whatsoever.
21. Demand has been made by Street Search and/or Jeff Podesta for payment in excess of
$1,000,000.00 relating to this alleged ownership interest.
22. Plaintiffs request the court to enter a Declaratory Judgment decreeing that neither Street
Search nor Jeff Podesta have any right, title or interest in and to Dollars and Sense and or
Profits Plus or any of their assets and that the independent contractor consulting agreement
entered into with Street Search and or Jeff Podesta has been terminated.
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for over a year;" 6 "The business relationship was based on an agreement, which Street Search
contends involved an exchange of its services for an ownership interest in Coleman's limited
partnership, whose principal place of business was in Idaho; " 7 and "Street Search has claimed
ownership of a business owned by an Idaho resident [Coleman] with its principal place of
business in ldaho." 8
Upon review, the Appellants respectfully request the Court identify what basis it has to
conclude that Podesta and/or Street Search were ever dealing with Coleman in his individual
capacity, and not as a member of the foreign LLC? How does allegedly doing business with a
foreign LLC equate to contracting with an individual member for jurisdictional purposes? There
certainly are no pleadings or allegations in the Verified Complaint or in Coleman's affidavit that
Coleman was contracting with Podesta or Street Search in any individual capacity. Additionally,
such a conclusion appears to violate both the Idaho and Delaware Codes, which establish that
individual members lack standing in any litigation against the LLC unless the members are
named individually.
If Coleman has no standing9 to involve himself personally in a conflict with the foreign
LLC in which he is a member, how is his residence in Idaho relevant for asserting jurisdiction in
Idaho? "A central foundation of the Idaho Declaratory Judgment Act is the requirement of
adverse parties. Whitney v. Randall, 58 Idaho 49, 70 P.2d 384 (1937). For the parties to be in an
0 pmwn,
. .
p. 8.
Opinion, p. 10.
8
Opinion, p. 11.
9
"Because the issue of standing is jurisdictional, Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits. 135 Idaho 121, 124,
15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000), it may be raised at any time, Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 35, 644 P.2d 355, 357
(1982)." Tungsten Holdings, Inc. v. Drake, 143 Idaho 69, 72, 137 P.3d 456,459, 143 Idaho 69,72 (2006). And,
"Generally issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered." State v. Rogers. 140 Idaho 223,227,91
P.3d 1127, 1131 (2004). However, the issues of standing and mootness can be raised at any time, including for the
first time on appeal. See Hawkins v. Bonneville Cnty. Bd. ofComm 'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 231, 254 P.3d 1224, 1227
(2011); In re Doe I, 145 Idaho 337,340, 179 P.3d 300, 303 (2008). McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 153
Idaho 425,431,283 P.3d 742,748 (2012).
6

7
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adversarial position, they must have such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy that
a meaningful representation and advocacy of the issues is ensured." Afiles v. Idaho Power Co.,
116Idaho 635,641,778 P.2d 757,763 (1989), citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study

Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct. 2620 2630, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). (Emphasis added.) Here,
Coleman has no personal stake because he has no personal interest in either the foreign LLC or
the foreign LP. As an example; if Podesta or Street Search had filed a breach of contract action
against the Fund and Profits Plus and named Coleman personally, Coleman undoubtedly would
assert he has no personal liability and is protected from personal liability because he was doing
business as an LLC. As that would be a viable defense, how does Coleman, under these
circumstances, have any personal interest in the declaratory judgment claims related to the
foreign LP and foreign LLC? Clearly, he does not, as he pled in his Verified Complaint.
Accordingly, it appears to be error to consider Coleman as an "owner" of these entities and then
to conclude that somehow this fact establishes Idaho was the principle place of business for these
foreign entities.
III. The Court Made Assumptions Of Fact That Are Not Supported In The Record.

Respectfully, the Appellants argue that the Court's assumption of key facts denied the
Appellants due process. In its decision, the Court repeatedly refers to either the Fund or Profits
Plus and concludes these entities' principle place of business is in Idaho. The Appellants
respectfully assert that the Court is mistaken, even with the biased standard of review.
However, this case arises out of a claimed ownership interest in a company
whose principal place of business is Idaho and the alleged consideration for that
ownership interest are the very services Podesta performed that constitute the
transaction ofbusiness in Idaho. P. 9.

The business relationship was based on an agreement, which Street Search contends
involved an exchange of its services for an ownership interest in Coleman's limited
partnership, whose principal place of business was in Idaho. P. 10
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Street Search has claimed ownership of a business owned by an Idaho resident
with its principal place of business in Idaho. P. 11.
Street Search asserted a fifty percent ownership interest in a company whose
only physical activity is storage of precious metals, which takes place entirely in
Idaho. P. 8.
The Court stated the standard of review it was applying in its decision:
"The question of the existence of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant
is one oflaw, which this Court reviews freely. Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC,
143 Idaho 723, 726, 152 P.3d 594, 597 (2007) (quoting Knutsen v. Cloud, 142 Idaho
148, 150, 124 P.3d 1024, 1026 (2005)). When reviewing a motion to dismiss based
on lack of personal jurisdiction, this Court applies the same standard as when
reviewing appeals from summary judgment orders; "we construe the evidence
presented to the district court in favor of the party opposing the order and accord that
party the benefit of all inferences which might be reasonably drawn." Knutsen, 142
Idaho at 150, 124 P.3d at 1026. Accordingly, in reviewing the district court's denial
of Street Search's motion to dismiss, we construe the evidence in favor of
Coleman." 10
However, the operative word in the standard is "evidence."
Nowhere in the Verified pleading do the Respondents plead either the foreign LP or the
foreign LLC had its "principle place of business" in Idaho. 11 "For the purpose of testing the
sufficiency of a pleading, averments of time and place are material and shall be considered
like all other averments of material matter." I.R.C.P. 9(f). As the verified complaint may be
considered as an affidavit, the plaintiffs provide no evidence that either of these entities has its
principle place of business in Idaho. In fact, the lack of such an averment should be construed as
an admission that neither foreign entity had its principle place of business in Idaho.
Coleman also claims in his affidavit that the foreign LP Fund is "registered" in Idaho with
the Idaho Department of Finance. However, as a Regulation D Fund there is no "registration"; the

10

11

Opinion, p. 5.
The Respondents do not even plead that the foreign LP is doing business in Idaho. (R. p. 26.)
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fund files a notice of exemption with the Department of Finance, as Podesta testifies in his
affidavit. (R. p. 39.) Also see, http://finance.idaho.gov/securities/Exemptions.aspx.
Yes, Coleman claims he resides in Idaho, but again, how does that fact give rise to the
ultimate conclusion the principle place of business for the foreign LP or the foreign LLC is in
Idaho? Again, as argued above, Coleman lacks standing related to any claim for declaratory
judgment. The facts also establish that Coleman contacted Podesta in New Jersey and both
Coleman and Podesta traveled to New York and to Arizona together. Profits Plus and Dollars
and Sense are clearly doing business in other jurisdictions.
Having failed to plead or even assert the principle place of business for the foreign LP or
the foreign LLC was Idaho, why are the Respondents entitled to this assumption? Moreover, the
facts establish that Coleman never registered the foreign LP or the foreign LLC with the Idaho
Secretary of State. While that fact may not impair these entities' ability to contract, that evidence
certainly undermines any assertion Idaho was intended as the principle place of business for
either of these foreign entities.
There is also no evidence that the Foreign LP Fund stored precious metals exclusively in
Idaho. There is evidence that some of the Fund's metal was stored in Idaho, but there simply is
no evidence that all of the Foreign LP Fund's metal was stored here. In paragraph 19 of
Coleman's affidavit, he states; "While Jeffrey Podesta was in Idaho Mr. Podesta and your affiant
also inspected the Garda vault storage facility at which Dollars and Sense was storing precious
metals." (R. p. 56.) If as Coleman also claims, Podesta was in Idaho looking for additional vault
space 12 , then the logical conclusion is the Fund has other metals stored elsewhere. If that was

12

(Coleman's Aff. para, 20.) Following Jeffrey Podesta business trip to Idaho, he continued to make contacts with
Corky Gowans regarding the purchase of property in Idaho for Dollars and Sense to store precious metals. (R. p.
56.)
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not true, then there should be statements in Coleman's affidavit such as; "Dollars and Sense
stores all of its precious metal in Idaho."
As the Court must consider Podesta and Street Search's right to due process, it was error
for the Court to make these huge assumptions of fact on such a minimum record, and then to
assert personal jurisdiction was proper in Idaho.
IV. The Trial Court Erred When It Refused To Instruct On Promissory Estoppel As
Respondents Had Placed The Lack Of Consideration At Issue In This Case.
Respectfully, the Appellants assert that the Court's statement; "Coleman is correct that
consideration was not at issue in this case ... ," (Opinion p. 21.), is not supported by the record.
In Jury Instruction No. 17, the Court instructed the Jury' "There are four elements to a complete
contract. Every contract must have these four elements. The four elements are: ... 3. Valid
consideration; .... " (R. p. 666.) That instruction goes on to state; "It is not disputed that the
following element is present in the contract alleged in this case: The parties are competent to
enter into a contract." After hearing all of the evidence, Judge Greenwood instructed the Jury
that the parties were disputing three of the elements required to create a valid contract; including
a dispute as to whether or not there was valid consideration.
Then in Jury Instruction No. 25, the Court instructed the Jury that the Respondents
claimed; "In this case Profits Plus alleges that there was no and/or insufficient consideration to
support the existence of a contract." The rest of this Instruction describes and defines
"consideration" in detail. (R. p. 674.)
If "consideration" was not at issue in this case, as this Court concluded, then the jury
should have been instructed in Instruction 17, the parties did not dispute that there was
consideration. However, contrary to this Court's conclusion, that was a hotly contested issue
necessitating Instructions 17, and 25. "[T]he determination of whether the instruction is
APPELLANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING- 11

supported by the facts is committed to the discretion of the district court Vanderford Co., Inc. v.
Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 555, 165 P.3d 261, 269, (2007). Accordingly, the Trial Court after

hearing all of the evidence instructed the jury that the Respondents disputed there was
consideration to support a contract because there were facts presented at trial related to the
existence or lack of consideration.
"The correctness of jury instructions 'is a question oflaw over which this Court exercises
free review, and the standard of review of whether a jury instruction should or should not have
been given, is whether there is evidence at trial to support the instruction."' Vanderford Co., Inc.
v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 552,165 P.3d 261,266, (2007), quoting Craig Johnson Constr.,
L.L.C. v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 Idaho 797,800, 134 P.3d 648,651 (2006) (quoting
Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 750, 86 P.3d 458, 464 (2004)). Here, by giving Instructions 17

and 25 the Trial Court is confirming it considered the evidence presented at trial, and believed
there were facts indicating a dispute as to valid consideration.
Additionally, "[a] party is entitled to have its theory ofthe case included in the
instructions given to the jury if that theory is supported by any reasonable view of the evidence."
Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 165 P.3d 261, 269, 144 Idaho 547, 555 (2007), citing Doty v.
Bishara, 123 Idaho 329, 334, 848 P.2d 387, 392 (1992). The District Court refused to give

Street Search's Proposed Jury Instruction No. 10, titled "Promissory Estoppel," a copy of which
is attached, and was attached as Exhibit 10 to the Appellants' Brief. This instruction begins;
"Even in the absence of consideration, however, the law recognizes that in some circumstances a
promise may become enforceable by reason of the promisee's having justifiably relied upon it."
Obviously, where lack of consideration is at issue, the Court should have given a promissory
estoppel instruction.
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"Reversible error occurs when an instruction misleads the jury or prejudices a party."
Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 555, 165 P.3d 261, 269 (2007); Perry v. Magic
Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51,995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000) (citing Lawton v. City of
Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 462, 886 P.2d 330, 338 (1994)). In Appellants' Brief they set forth the
elements of promissory estoppel and cited facts in the record to support each element. If the jury
believed the Respondents' contention there was no consideration, and therefore no contract,
which based on Jury Instructions 17 and 25, was certainly a possibility, then it was reversible
error for the Trial Court to refuse to instruct the jury on promissory estoppel. Accordingly, the
Appellants were denied a fair trial when the District Court refused to give a promissory estoppel
instruction.
V. The Appropriate Jury Instructions Were Before The Trial Court And This Court On
Appeal. Accordingly The Appellants Request That The Court Address The Substance Of
The Appellants' I.R.C.P. Sl(A) And Sl(B) Arguments In Light Of The Plain Error
Doctrine.
Respectfully, the Appellants believe the Court should have considered the jury
instructions in the record. On page 43 ofthe Appellants' Brief, they stated; "Coleman filed
proposed jury instructions that included element instructions for Street Search's
Constructive Fraud and Fraud claims. (Plaintiffs' /Counterdefendants' Proposed Jury
Instruction Nos. 40, 42, and 43.) On January 23, 2012, Podesta filed his "Objection/NonObjections" to the Plaintiffs' proposed instructions. (R., p. 594-98.) Podesta did not object to
Plaintiffs' Proposed instruction Nos. 40, 42 and 43. 20 " The citation to footnote 20 stated; "The
Plaintiffs and Defendants' proposed Jury instructions are in the Clerk's record according to
Supreme Court Order dated April26, 2013." 13 Based on having clearly identified that these
Instructions were in the record, the Appellants do not understand how this Court could conclude

13

Proposed Jury Instructions 40, 42 and 43, are attached to this Brief for the Court's convenience.
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there were no element instructions for Street Search's fraud and constructive fraud claims in the
record on appeal as the Court stated in its opinion.
Although the Court is correct Podesta and Street search did not submit their own fraud
and constructive fraud instructions; why would Street Search have to submit additional jury
instructions identical to those proposed by the Respondents if the proposed instruction included
the proper and correct elements of Street Search's claims? Street Search did not file proposed
constructive fraud and fraud jury instructions, nor did Street Search need to file additional
element instructions because the Respondents had filed Proposed Instruction Nos. 40, 42 and 43.
On April8, 2013, Appellants filed a Appellant's Second Motion to Augment the Record
and attached copies ofDEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS; DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS; and PLAINTIFF'S/COUNTERDEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTION, all of which were conformed copies. The Court granted the Appellants' Motion
to Augment The Record by order on April26, 2013, in which the Court stated: "IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that Appellants' SECOND MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be, and herby
is, GRANTED, and the augmentation record shall include the items listed below, copies of which
are attached to this Motion. 1. Defendant's Exhibit E; 2 Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions;
and 3. Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions." 14 Included in Plaintiffs' proposed instructions were
Instruction Nos. 40, 42, and 43 which are attached to this brief for the Court's convenience. Prior
to trial the Appellants filed DEFENDANTS/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S OBJECTIONS/NONOBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERDEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, and specifically filed non-objections to Proposed Instruction Nos. 40, 42 and
43, as these instructions were in the same form and substance as any fraud or constructive
14

Order Granting Second Motion to Augment the Record- Docket No. 39964-2012, signed on April26, 2014.
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fraud instruction that Street Search would have filed. Accordingly, there were jury instructions
in the record addressing Street Search's fraud and constructive fraud claims, both before the
District Court and before this Court on AppeaL
Contrary to the Court's ruling, there were constructive fraud and fraud jury instructions
setting forth Street Search's claims presented to the trial court on January 23, 2013 according to
the Record of Action. (R. p. 16.) Those instructions included the Proposed Instructions Nos. 40,
41 and 42, which clearly stated the elements for Street Search's claims for constructive fraud and
fraud. The Trial Court did not include these Instructions in the Instructions it filed into the
record on February 21,2012, which were read to the Jury. (R. p. 648-695.) Accordingly, the
record confirms the District Court did not give any jury instruction related to Street Search's
fraud or constructive fraud claims although there were such instructions submitted to the Trial
Court.
The Appellants respectfully contend this Court refused to address application of I.R.C.P.
5l(a) and the Trial Court's resulting duty to make a record based on the several erroneous
conclusions.
Street Search contends that the district court violated I.R.C.P. 51(a) by failing to
make a record of its refusal to instruct the jury on its fraud and constructive fraud
claims. However, because the record on appeal does not include Coleman's
amended proposed jury instructions, it is not clear whether fraud and constructive
fraud instructions were before the court when it ultimately ruled on the final jury
instructions. Moreover, Street Search concedes it never proposed instructions on
fraud and constructive fraud, arguing that this failure to propose instructions was
due to the district court's dismissal of these claims in a jury instruction
conference.
(Opinion p. 19.)
With the utmost respect, this Court clearly would have know there were element
instructions concerning Street Search's fraud and constructive fraud claim if thus Court had read

APPELLANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING- l5

the proposed instructions and Street Search's Notice ofNon-objection. Street Search did not
"concede" it did not file proposed jury instructions, but clearly contended it did not file
unnecessary and redundant copies of element instructions related to Street Search's claims that
were already in the record and before the Court. As these instructions were in the record, the
Trial Court had a duty according to LR.C.P. 51 (a)(l) to make a record of its decision whether or
not to give the respective instructions. If there was an insufficient record, it was due to the Trial
Court's failure to follow the clear mandate in I.R.C.P. 5l(a)(l). Accordingly, the Appellants are
entitled to a ruling on whether the Trial Court erred when it failed to make the mandatory record
regarding attorney fees.
Additionally, as it is undisputed that Street Search's element instructions were in the
record, both in the trial court and on appeal, the Appellants respectfully request the Court address
and consider its JR.CP. 51 (b) is unconstitutional argument in light ofthe Appellants' assertion
it amounts to plain error to dismiss a cause of action by refusing to give a element jury
instruction. This Court did not address this issue, and instead claimed it did not have the
appropriate jury instructions to review. To the contrary, based on the record, these instructions
were available to this Court on appeal.
Again, it would certainly constitute plain error for a trial court to dismiss a cause of
action by refusing to give a requested element jury instruction. Unfortunately, we do not have a
record of the Trial Court's actions as required by I.R.C.P. 5l(a)(l). Without such a record, the
Appellants are entitled to a new trial.

VI. The Idaho Court's Exercise Of Personal Jurisdiction Over Podesta And Street Search
Violates Due Process.
Respectfully, it is undisputed the Podesta and Street Search were in Idaho for less than 24
hours based on a promise by a foreign LP and a foreign

of a contractual relationship. There
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was absolutely no evidence that Podesta or Street Search advertized in Idaho or that Podesta or
Street Search would have ever been in Idaho for any reason other than to act on the promise of a
contractual relationship by the plaintiffs. Accordingly, there is no evidence that the Respondents
established the foundational requirement for personal jurisdiction of purposeful availment.
This "purposeful availment" requirement ensures that a defendant will not
be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of "random," "fortuitous," or
"attenuated" contacts, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S., at 774, 104
S.Ct., at 1478; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, supra, 444 U.S., at
299, 100 S.Ct., at 568, or of the "unilateral activity of another party or a third
person," Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, SA. v. Hall, supra, 466 U.S., at
417, I 04 S.Ct., at 1873. 17 Jurisdiction is proper, however, where the contacts
proximately result from actions by the defendant himselfthat create a "substantial
connection" with the forum State. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,
supra, 355 U.S., at 223, 78 S.Ct., at 201; see also Kulka v. California Superior
Court, supra, 436 U.S., at 94, n. 7, 98 S.Ct., at 1698, n. 7.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (Emphasis added.)
The Appellants on review respectfully request that the Court identify any affirmative acts
performed by Podesta or Street Search that were not predicated on Coleman's contact with
Podesta in New Jersey, and Profit Plus's solicitation of Street Search's and/or Podesta's
involvement in the LP Fund. The record established that neither Podesta nor Street Search had
any prior involvement with Idaho, business or otherwise, until after Podesta was contacted by
Coleman. Neither Podesta nor Street Search ever advertized in Idaho or had any clients who
resided in the state. Neither Podesta nor Street Search produced any materials, sales brochures
or any other media that somehow found itself into the state of Idaho. Neither Podesta nor Street
Search ever advertized via the internet so that any information could have been provided to
Idaho resident via that medium. Nor were Podesta or Street Search involved in manufacturing
any products that ultimately were delivered to Idaho. It is therefore undisputed that Podesta or
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Street Search's relationship with Idaho was based solely on the "unilateral activity of another
party."
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has affirmed that it must be the Defendant's
actions, not the Plaintiffs' as is clearly the case here, which prompted the contacts in the forum
state.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a state
court to exert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. "[T]he
constitutional touchstone" of the determination whether an exercise of personal
jurisdiction comports with due process "remains whether the defendant
purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in the forum State." Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,474, 105 S.Ct. 2174 2183,85 L.Ed.2d 528
(1985), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S., at 316,66 S.Ct.,
at 158. Most recently we have reaffirmed the oft-quoted reasoning of Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228 1239, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), that
minimum contacts must have a basis in "some act by which the defendant
purposefully avail itself ofthe privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Burger King, 4 71
U.S., at 475, 105 S.Ct., at 2183. "Jurisdiction is proper ... where the contacts
proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a
'substantial connection' with the forum State." Ibid, quoting 1\1cGee v.
International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 201, 2 L.Ed.2d
223 (1957) (emphasis in original).
Asahi Metal Industry Co. Ltd v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 108-109 (1987).
(Italic emphasis in the orginal ... bold added for emphasis here.)

Podesta testified by way of affidavit that Coleman contacted Podesta in New Jersey and
solicited Podesta's involvement in Profits Plus's business. (R. p. 37.) Then Podesta testified that
he traveled to Idaho at Coleman's request. (R. p. 37.) These facts were and remain undisputed
by any plaintiff. While the Court asserted jurisdiction was proper because Podesta and or Street
Search claimed an ownership interest in an Idaho business, the Court ignores the material fact
that Podesta and Street Search's belief was premised on a promise by the plaintiffs of such a
relationship. Perhaps the result would be different if Podesta contacted Coleman in Idaho and
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Podesta offered to purchase an ownership interest in the foreign LP, but that certainly is not the
case.
The fundamental analysis for purposeful availment is what prompted the defendant's
foray into the jurisdiction. In other words, how did the defendant's contact with the forum
originate. If the defendant's contacts did not originate based on the defendant's own volition,
then there is no affirmative personal availment. However, the Court does not address this issue,
but merely addresses what Podesta and Street Search did after being contacted by Coleman,
which prompted Street Search to claim an ownership interest in the foreign LP and for Podesta to
travel to Idaho for his single visit.
The Appellants respectfully argue it was error for the Court to disregard this fundamental
analysis, and request the Court revisit its decision and to then consider the undisputed facts that
the only reason Podesta and/or Street Search were ever in Idaho was based on and the result of
promises made by the plaintiffs. As there was no purposeful availment, jurisdiction in Idaho was
not appropriate and denied Podesta and Street Search due process.

VII. The Appellants Properly Appealed From The Verdict And Post-Trial Motions.
Respectfully, the Appellants appropriately appealed from all relevant orders, judgments
or rulings. A "verdict" is not identified as an "appealable order" in LA.R. 11. However, the
verdict was referenced and identified in the Judgment and Decree entered on April 5, 2012, (R.
p. 735.), from which the Appellants timely appealed. (R. p. 782.) Moreover, the Appellants cited
to I.A.R. 17(e) in their Notice of Appeal. (R. p. 782.) Clearly, the order denying the Appellants'
Motion for JNOV or for New Trial is an order entered after the judgment from which the
Appellants have appealed.
I.A.R. 17(e) Designation of Appeal.
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(1) A Designation of the Judgment or Order Appealed From. The notice of appeal
shall designate the judgment or order appealed from which shall be deemed to
include, and present on appeal:
(A) All interlocutory judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment,
order or decree appealed from, and

***
(C) All interlocutory or final judgments and orders entered after the judgment
or order appealed from except orders relinquishing jurisdiction after a period of
retained jurisdiction or orders granting probation following a period of retained
jurisdiction.
In Jury Instruction 35, the Court instructed the Jury that if Street Search proved a breach
of fiduciary duty, then it was entitled to the "amount of money that will reasonably and fairly
compensate the injured party for any loss proximately caused by the breach." (R. p. 684.)
However, it is undisputed that during the trial the Trial Court refused to allow Street Search to
prove these damages. If the Court remands to the Trial Court for new trial, the Appellants
request this Court order the Trial Court to allow Appellants to prove their tort damages during
the new trial.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing argument, and the facts of record, the Appellants respectfully
request the Court reconsider its decision and grant Appellants' Petition for Rehearing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of August 2014.
IATES, ATTORNEYS

Eric R. Clark
Attorney for Appellants
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